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Beijing’s priorities here are about expanding political influence and embedding itself in regional security architectures. This explains its existing military presence in Djibouti and infrastructure investments across Ethiopia, as well as neighbouring states like Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan.
The second path is specific to Somalia. It is mainly shaped by China’s domestic politics and stance on Taiwan. Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province, and is concerned that Somaliland’s ties with Taipei could lend legitimacy to separatist movements. Somaliland is a de facto independent state that left its voluntary union with Somalia in 1991, and diplomatically recognised Taiwan in 2020.
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China is increasingly involved in Somalia because of Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and its progress in pushing for its own international recognition.
Since 1949, Taiwan has been an independent, self-governing state, though the People’s Republic of China lays claim to the island.
Beijing has worked over the past three decades to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. It’s offered development, technology and infrastructure assistance in exchange for states severing diplomatic relations with Taipei.
As of 2026, only Eswatini and Somaliland in Africa maintain some form of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
From Beijing’s perspective, the fact that a small, de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa had the temerity to exchange diplomats with Taiwan was bad enough. When Israel became the first state to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence in December 2025, Beijing reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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