I believe you are mistaken, comrade. I am not actually Nikita Khrushchev nor am I Mao Zedong. Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era and the Gang of Four must be considered from that context, and not merely from one aspect of Mao’s critique of Khrushchev’s policy before the Gang of Four era.
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era
You’ve probably misunderstood me again, Comrade.
What you call Deng Xiaoping’s “openness,” Mao called Khrushchev’s “revisionism.”
Deng did exactly what Khrushchev had attempted to do—only later. Or do you consider it a mistake on Mao’s part that he didn’t beat Khrushchev to the punch and establish relations with the West first?
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
I don’t understand why you—a man with the mindset of a dialectical materialist—are always prone to idealizing things. It is still a Party, and the same internal Party struggle is at play.
Let me tell you how it all unfolded in the USSR. When Gorbachev came to power and launched Perestroika, a great many members of the Central Committee were opposed to it. This was the so-called “Old Guard”—or, if you prefer, you could call them the “Gang of Four.” These were Brezhnev’s people. Within a very short timeframe—and very quietly—these individuals were either removed from their posts or sidelined for one reason or another; some were compromised and forced to step down. It wasn’t as loud, brutal, or theatrical as the affair involving the original “Gang of Four,” but the result was the same: the entire Old Guard—that “Gang of Four”—simply dissolved into the ether of existence…
To suggest that the “Great Helmsman” Deng was thinking about the people or about reforms back then—much as Gorbachev supposedly was during Perestroika while simultaneously purging his rivals—is, at the very least, naive, Comrade! At that time, they were thinking about one thing and one thing only: power.
And I recently told you something untrue. Gorbachev did have a plan. It was the “Acceleration” plan—a concept originally conceived by Andropov. Andropov had entrusted its development to three individuals: Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and… well, I’ve forgotten the third one. This “Acceleration” plan concerned exclusively economic reforms—there were absolutely no political or ideological components to it!
Over the course of two years—largely thanks to Ryzhkov—the plan was fully developed, and in 1985, Gorbachev officially launched it. He immediately presented it during the very first plenary session of the Central Committee. It was Andropov’s “Acceleration” plan.
It was a plan for economic reforms!
Then, in 1987—when Perestroika truly began (that is, when the term Perestroika first started appearing in the newspapers)—the scope of the reforms expanded to encompass not only economic matters but also state-level and ideological issues. Ryzhkov opposed this expansion and subsequently resigned. This comes from the memoirs of Ryzhkov himself, who passed away not long ago.
Yakovlev—who at the time served as the USSR’s chief ideologue—bears the entire blame. It was he who persuaded Gorbachev to undertake ideological reform. This was a fatal error!
However, to this day, I still cannot determine whether or not the CIA had a hand in it.
This is because Yakovlev spent a great deal of time working at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Gorbachev, too, traveled there at Yakovlev’s invitation—long before he became president. Yakovlev arranged a meeting between Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau—presumably, the modern-day Trudeau is his son or grandson. While in Canada, Gorbachev also met with representatives from the United States. This took place in the early 1980s. It would be fascinating to know what exactly they discussed there. I do not rule out the possibility that Yakovlev was working for the CIA—perhaps even unwittingly.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
Yes, I agree that retaining political control is to Mao’s credit, as he built the foundation of the state apparatus.
The Chinese CPC labeled Khrushchev’s rapprochement with the West as “Khrushchev’s revisionism.”
Some time later, Deng initiated a rapprochement with the West. The Chinese CPC called this “opening up.”
but to equate Khrushchev and Deng is to make a clear error.
Khrushchev was a pale, insignificant figure compared to Stalin—and likely compared to Mao, too.
Someone in China once said—I don’t recall the exact words or who said it—that Mao was the matador and Khrushchev the bull.
Comparing Mao and Khrushchev is indeed inappropriate—except, perhaps, regarding their education and experience in economic management. In every other respect, Mao was a far more significant figure. A characteristic trait of Khrushchev’s during the Stalin era was that he executed orders very well but never showed initiative. That is likely how Khrushchev differed from Mao; Khrushchev was a sycophant and a careerist.
For instance, during the purges, Khrushchev ranked second in terms of the number of people on the lists of suspects he submitted to Stalin for approval. He was zealous in his efforts to curry favor with Stalin.
And then he accused Stalin of the very thing he himself did better than anyone else… )))
It’s widely acknowledged that the later Mao era and the era of the Gang of Four was filled with mistakes, and that Reform & Opening Up was a course correction. You may call this “double standards,” but learning from mistakes when practice doesn’t live up to expectations is how we grow.
I believe you are mistaken, comrade. I am not actually Nikita Khrushchev nor am I Mao Zedong. Any “double-standard” you see with Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up as a result of problems with the late Mao era and the Gang of Four must be considered from that context, and not merely from one aspect of Mao’s critique of Khrushchev’s policy before the Gang of Four era.
Regarding the Gang of Four, they were largely an extension of Mao’s incorrect lines towards the end of his life, without most of his positive lines. Deng Xiaoping corrected the course for the new era of development, having inherited a basically industrialized economy but with widespread poverty and backwards technology.
As for China outmaneuvering the west, I agree. This is pretty plainly what happened, despite what the west thought they could get away with, China maintained a dictatorship of the proletariat and maintained political control in the socialist market economy.
You’ve probably misunderstood me again, Comrade.
What you call Deng Xiaoping’s “openness,” Mao called Khrushchev’s “revisionism.”
Deng did exactly what Khrushchev had attempted to do—only later. Or do you consider it a mistake on Mao’s part that he didn’t beat Khrushchev to the punch and establish relations with the West first?
I don’t understand why you—a man with the mindset of a dialectical materialist—are always prone to idealizing things. It is still a Party, and the same internal Party struggle is at play.
Let me tell you how it all unfolded in the USSR. When Gorbachev came to power and launched Perestroika, a great many members of the Central Committee were opposed to it. This was the so-called “Old Guard”—or, if you prefer, you could call them the “Gang of Four.” These were Brezhnev’s people. Within a very short timeframe—and very quietly—these individuals were either removed from their posts or sidelined for one reason or another; some were compromised and forced to step down. It wasn’t as loud, brutal, or theatrical as the affair involving the original “Gang of Four,” but the result was the same: the entire Old Guard—that “Gang of Four”—simply dissolved into the ether of existence…
To suggest that the “Great Helmsman” Deng was thinking about the people or about reforms back then—much as Gorbachev supposedly was during Perestroika while simultaneously purging his rivals—is, at the very least, naive, Comrade! At that time, they were thinking about one thing and one thing only: power.
And I recently told you something untrue. Gorbachev did have a plan. It was the “Acceleration” plan—a concept originally conceived by Andropov. Andropov had entrusted its development to three individuals: Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and… well, I’ve forgotten the third one. This “Acceleration” plan concerned exclusively economic reforms—there were absolutely no political or ideological components to it!
Over the course of two years—largely thanks to Ryzhkov—the plan was fully developed, and in 1985, Gorbachev officially launched it. He immediately presented it during the very first plenary session of the Central Committee. It was Andropov’s “Acceleration” plan.
It was a plan for economic reforms!
Then, in 1987—when Perestroika truly began (that is, when the term Perestroika first started appearing in the newspapers)—the scope of the reforms expanded to encompass not only economic matters but also state-level and ideological issues. Ryzhkov opposed this expansion and subsequently resigned. This comes from the memoirs of Ryzhkov himself, who passed away not long ago.
Yakovlev—who at the time served as the USSR’s chief ideologue—bears the entire blame. It was he who persuaded Gorbachev to undertake ideological reform. This was a fatal error!
However, to this day, I still cannot determine whether or not the CIA had a hand in it.
This is because Yakovlev spent a great deal of time working at the Soviet Embassy in Canada. Gorbachev, too, traveled there at Yakovlev’s invitation—long before he became president. Yakovlev arranged a meeting between Gorbachev and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau—presumably, the modern-day Trudeau is his son or grandson. While in Canada, Gorbachev also met with representatives from the United States. This took place in the early 1980s. It would be fascinating to know what exactly they discussed there. I do not rule out the possibility that Yakovlev was working for the CIA—perhaps even unwittingly.
Yes, I agree that retaining political control is to Mao’s credit, as he built the foundation of the state apparatus.
Deng did not do what Khrushchev did, for the following key reasons:
Deng upheld Stalin and Mao, refusing to create a historical nihilism among the people.
Deng did not state that class struggle was over, but instead that it was alive and well, and must be constantly watched out for.
Deng turned a largely backwards economy into a more progressive form, Khrushchev weakened a more advanced economy into a more regressive one.
I appreciate the added background detail for the Soviet perspective, but to equate Khrushchev and Deng is to make a clear error.
No, that’s not at all what I mean, Comrade!
I am talking about double standards:
The Chinese CPC labeled Khrushchev’s rapprochement with the West as “Khrushchev’s revisionism.”
Some time later, Deng initiated a rapprochement with the West. The Chinese CPC called this “opening up.”
Khrushchev was a pale, insignificant figure compared to Stalin—and likely compared to Mao, too.
Someone in China once said—I don’t recall the exact words or who said it—that Mao was the matador and Khrushchev the bull.
Comparing Mao and Khrushchev is indeed inappropriate—except, perhaps, regarding their education and experience in economic management. In every other respect, Mao was a far more significant figure. A characteristic trait of Khrushchev’s during the Stalin era was that he executed orders very well but never showed initiative. That is likely how Khrushchev differed from Mao; Khrushchev was a sycophant and a careerist.
For instance, during the purges, Khrushchev ranked second in terms of the number of people on the lists of suspects he submitted to Stalin for approval. He was zealous in his efforts to curry favor with Stalin.
And then he accused Stalin of the very thing he himself did better than anyone else… )))
It’s widely acknowledged that the later Mao era and the era of the Gang of Four was filled with mistakes, and that Reform & Opening Up was a course correction. You may call this “double standards,” but learning from mistakes when practice doesn’t live up to expectations is how we grow.