"The momentum is real."

It’s amazing what a difference a little bit of time can make: Two years after kicking off what looked to be a long-shot campaign to push back on the practice of shutting down server-dependent videogames once they’re no longer profitable, Stop Killing Games founder Ross Scott and organizer Moritz Katzner appeared in front of the European Parliament to present their case—and it seemed to go very well.

Official Stream: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/committee-on-internal-market-and-consumer-protection-ordinary-meeting-committee-on-legal-affairs-com_20260416-1100-COMMITTEE-IMCO-JURI-PETI

Digital Fairness Act: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14622-Digital-Fairness-Act/F33096034_en

  • porcoesphino@mander.xyzEnglish
    4·
    9 hours ago

    Agreed, but I think a framing or two is missing here, and it only applies to a subset, is that the people of the world shouldn’t have to deal with more/larger bot nets because these things haven’t been considered.

    Another is just that the average great aunt isn’t opting into a concept of insecurity they’re simply ignorant to what threats there are. If it’s possible to distinguish between the two sets of people, or to maybe even bucket devices by potential threat, it might go a long away. I probably a lot wrong here, I just woke up.

    But yeah, agreed security is an argument that’s hidden behind

    • qqq@lemmy.worldEnglish
      8·
      9 hours ago

      Yes I’m not going to take some “survival of the fittest” nonsense approach to security: consumers need securely built devices and software. This is the first line of defense always: we need to make things secure and then have secure defaults according to whatever we decide “secure” means in the context of our widget or software. Then we need to provide “advanced” (or even just “ignorant but risk tolerant”) users with the ability to change the device or software to match their definition of “secure”.

      The easiest example is secure boot. Your laptop likely has a key provided by your OEM and likely Microsoft’s key preinstalled. This is a valid “secure boot” path for the average user, provided your OEM and Microsoft don’t get compromised, which is APT territory. However you are provided with the ability to use a different key if you know how to do that. You have thus opted in to protecting your own private key but now you have more control over your device. This design is notably absent in phones, which is absolutely bananas and actually less secure in some threat models

      You could extend examples like this if you wanted. One could easily imagine a device that does soft brick itself after the EOL date to simply protect people that are ignorant of the potential risks, but also provides an advanced user with the ability to revive it in a “less secure” state. The less advanced user will then have to either learn something new or buy a new device.