Did you know that if a spammer uses your email address as the FROM: address, which is easy to do, all the bounce messages will go to your email address? If the spammer really hates you, they will send millions of emails with your FROM: address and you will get a million bounce messages.

Can you stop this or prevent this? No

Why would a mail provider send you a bounce message, knowing you’re innocent? Because that’s how someone wrote the protocol back then, and nobody changes it or does it differently because … reasons.

Does the spammer get a bounce message? Nope, not one.

Does the SMTP sending account owner whose credentials were stolen be notified about bounces so they can stop the spam? Nope.

Just millions of emails sent every day to poor schlameels who have no idea why they are getting them and who can’t do anything about them.

The more I learn about the email protocols, the more I realize how terrible the design is.

#emailsecurity #spoofing #cybersecurity #spam

    • Jerry on Mastodon@hear-me.socialOP
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      2 days ago

      @ikidd@lemmy.world People are not reading. You are not reading.

      SPF, DKIM and DMARC are not relevant. Those are instructions to the receiving servers which are not the ones sending the bounces. The receiving server is telling the sending server, based on these DNS records, that it will not accept the message. It refuses them. Period. No bounce message.

      The sending server then, as a courtesy, lets the sender know, solely based on the FROM: address, that the email could not be delivered, as one by one messages.

      There are no DNS records or configurations that control this. The SMTP server follows the protocol which is to inform the FROM: address, as a courtesy, that the email was not accepted. It is the sender. It does not look at SPF, DMARC, and DKIM rules. That is only what the destination server uses.

      • ikidd@lemmy.world
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        2 days ago

        The point is that if an SMTP server is respecting RFC7208 then you don’t get those bounces if you have the records. Which is most SMTP servers now.

          • ikidd@lemmy.world
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            2 days ago

            Maybe Hotmail, I couldn’t say about freemail domains, but I get dmarc reports for recipients on Office 365 hosted domains all the time and have for years. They were one of the earliest adopters, since I’ve had a dmarc policy for my domains for over a decade.

      • superkret@feddit.org
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        2 days ago

        Is the recipient server drops or quarantines spam instead of rejecting it (which is standard best practice), the sending server will never know, and won’t send a message back to the sender.

        • Jerry on PieFed@feddit.online
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          DMARC has only 3 options. Ignore, reject or quarantine. There is no “drop” instead of “reject”. And anything other than an “ignore” will cause a reject from the receiving server back to the sending server who will then inform the FROM address that the email was not delivered.

        • Jerry on PieFed@feddit.online
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          3 days ago

          Yes, but then what? Your email provider will kindly let you know, as a courtesy, that the email you sent could not be delivered. Normally, you want this notification. Unfortunately, hotmail, for example, for one, does not determine whether you really sent the email or not. That the FROM: address has you, It will inform you anyway that the email was not delivered. There are no DNS records to stop this.

          • nomad@infosec.pub
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            3 days ago

            Nope, they look up the domain dmarc record for the sending domain and add all the dropped records to a aggregated abuse report which is sent as one email to your postmaster.

            • Jerry on PieFed@feddit.online
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              3 days ago

              If the email is not accepted by the receiving imap or pop3 server, it sometimes follows the DMARC instructions for reporting. The report goes to the domain owner of the sending domain. This is done by the receiving server. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC are instructions to the RECEIVING email server, not to the sending email server.

              The bounce I’m talking about is from your SMTP server that is following the protocol to let you know, as a courtesy, that your email could not be delivered. And that protocol simply says, in the absence of anything else saying otherwise, tell the FROM: address that their message did not get delivered, even if there is strong evidence that the FROM: address is a fraud.

  • kalpol@lemm.ee
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    2 days ago

    Most people these days filter while the SMTP session is still open. Reject while session is open and the actual sender gets the rejection.

    Forged reply-to only works when the session is closed and you accept the email then decide to bounce it.

  • ExperimentalGuy@programming.dev
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    2 days ago

    I haven’t looked into email in a while, but I’m pretty sure this is like saying TCP is insecure. Like yeah, if you communicate using plaintext over TCP you are vulnerable but most out of the box solutions nowadays don’t even function that way. You’d have to go write your own application that communicates using plaintext over TCP.

    In the same vein, the boxes out there that just run SMTP without any security would be the same way, but most boxes won’t be susceptible to this attack because very few people are running just SMTP.

    Disclaimer: I have not read up on SMTP in awhile but iirc, SMTP works with very little verification and is very susceptible to a lot of different attacks by itself.

  • hunderteins@toot.berlin
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    3 days ago

    @Jerry@hear-me.social when smtp was invented, the internet was a friendly, academic space, not a commercial molloch. The pain smtp is causing the last 30 years, isn’t enough, to switch over to encryted and signed E-mail

    • Jerry on Mastodon@hear-me.socialOP
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      2 days ago

      @lautreg SPF and DKIM are only used by the destination IMAP or POP3 servers to see what to do when they receive the email. In this case they reject it.

      The delivery failure message is coming from the sending server as a courtesy message to the sender to let them know their email was not delivered. The protocol is to tell the FROM: address that the email could not be delivered. The SMTP, sending server, doesn’t look at SPF, DKIM or DMARC or any DNS records or any other configuration related to it. It simply tells you the millions of emails sent with your FROM: address could not be delivered, one by one.

      People keep bringing up SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, but it’s not relevant to this problem.

      • LautreG@pouet.chapril.org
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        2 days ago

        @Jerry@hear-me.social
        Oh yes.
        I can’t check, but I think there is setting to refuse connexion with the sender server if SPF doesn’t mach.
        Like the policy in the DMARC?

        Or, in spamd/spamassassin, to just drop the incoming email in these case?

        (I’m on phone, I may write more wrongly than usual)

  • Geometrinen_Gepardi@sopuli.xyz
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    3 days ago

    The protocol was designed when there were practically no people on the net, compared to present day. In the beginning it was even customary to go by your own name.

  • faebudo@infosec.pub
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    3 days ago

    You want DMARC to protect the header From. This will protect you from backscatter due to out of office replies etc. Bounces go to the envelope from and are due to rejected mails.

    TL;DR Implement SPF to not get bounces and implement DMARC to not get backscatter.

    • Jerry on PieFed@feddit.online
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      SPF can’t be set up to stop bounces. It just indicates which servers are authorized to send email for the sending domain. It has nothing to do with the FROM: address. It’s only there to protect the owner of the domain from where the email is sent. It does not care about you.

      DMARC tells the receiving email server what to do if SPF and DKIM fail and often the instructions are to do nothing.

      If the receiving server ends up refusing the email because it fails SPF and/or DKIM and DMARC says to reject, the SMTP server, not the receiving server, sends the bounce to the FROM: address to tell the person their email could not be delivered.

      In summary, SPF and DKIM are about whether the email should be delivered. It says nothing about informing the sender that their email was not delivered. That’s a courtesy provided by your email provider.

      • faebudo@infosec.pub
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        3 days ago

        Yes, however RFC7208 says not to send NDR when sender authentication fails (=when SPF/DMARC is correctly set up it will fail) So you will get massively less backscatter. There will still be some providers sending NDRs however not the big ones, they will instead inform you via DMARC reporting which is easier to ignore.

        Generating non-delivery notifications to forged identities that have
           failed the authorization check often constitutes backscatter, i.e.,
           nuisance rejection notices that are not actionable.  Operators are
           strongly advised to avoid such practices
        
        • It’s still incumbent on the receiver to implement and follow DMARC and SPF rules. Email is, what, 44 years old, if you include RFC 822. SPF was introduced a mere 20 years ago, and DMARC is only 12 years old; Google started enforcing it only 10 years ago. There’s an entire sea of email server out there whose admins have not bothered to set up SPF, much less DMARC.

          There’s a huge gap between “should” and “do.”

          • faebudo@infosec.pub
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            3 days ago

            Ah yes. But you can just reject NDR messages with “550 5.7.509: Access denied, sending domain example.net does not pass DMARC verification and has a DMARC policy of reject” now.

  • corsicanguppy@lemmy.ca
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    3 days ago

    emails

    If you can’t spell the word right, I doubt your expertise on it.

    Look up “Joe job” in this context. It’s what we’ve called it for decades.